]]]]]]]]]]]]]      A LONG HISTORY OF DUPLICITY     [[[[[[[[[[[[[ 
                       By Arnold Beichman
(Mr. Beichman is a research fellow  at the Hoover Institution,
Stanford  University.   He is  writing  a book  on  Soviet treaty
diplomacy. This is a book review in The Wall Street Journal, 18 Nov 
1988, p. A20:4, of ``Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties'' 
Edited by Joseph D. Douglas Jr. [Pergamon-Brassey])

              [Kindly uploaded by Freeman 10602]

   What could  Winston Churchill  [1874-1965] have  been thinking
about when he said in the House  of Commons on Feb. 27, 1945: ``I
know of  no Government which  stands to its  obligations, even in
its   own  despite,   more  solidly   than  the   Russian  Soviet
government''?  Or President Roosevelt [1882-1945] when, referring
to Stalin  [1879-1953; head  of USSR,  1924-53] just  after Yalta
[1945],   he said:  ``I think  that  if I  give him  everything I
possibly can without demanding anything in return, then, noblesse
oblige, he will  not attempt to  annex anything and  will work to
build a peaceful and democratic world''?
   And  what could  President Reagan  [1911-] have  been thinking
when,  in  a  recent  interview  with  the  Washington  Post,  he
discussed Gorbachev [1931-] the Well Beloved in these words:
   ``He is the first leader that has come along who has gone back
before Stalin and that he is  trying to do what Lenin [1870-1924]
was teaching  ... with  Lenin's death.   Stalin actually reversed
many of the  things.  Lenin had  programs that he  called the new
economics and things of  that kind.  And I've  known a little bit
about Lenin and what he was advocating, and I think that this, in
glasnost and perestroika and all that, this is much more smacking
of Lenin  than of  Stalin.  And  I think  that this  is what [Mr.
Gorbachev] is trying to do.''
   Here are three of the  West's most powerful statesmen not only
concocting  fantasies  about  Soviet  history  but  also adopting
foreign policies and war-or-peace  guidelines based on them.  The
history of the Bolshevik Revolution  and its aftermath show quite
clearly that, as a treaty partner, the Soviet Union is simply not
to be trusted.  From the very  beginning, with the signing of the
Brest-Litovsk Treaty 70 years  ago, Soviet diplomacy has compiled
an undeniable  record of  duplicity, covert  and overt violations
and misinterpretations of treaty  texts.  (The only treaty Stalin
seems  to  have  lived  up  to  and  beyond  the  letter  was the
Nazi-Soviet  Pact  of  August 1939  --  until  Hitler [1889-1945]
violated it.)
   Western leaders  have done,  by and  large, little  about such
noncompliance,  as   ``Why  the  Soviets   Violate  Arms  Control
Treaties'' (Pergamon-Brassey,  215 pages, $32),  edited by Joseph
D. Douglas Jr., documents in great detail.
   Mr. Douglas is  a well-known national  security consultant who
has published  seven books  on arms  control strategies.  Written
under  contract with  the Central  Intelligence Agency,  the book
contains instructive  essays by  Jan Sejna,  onetime high-ranking
intelligence  officer  in  Czechoslovakia,  on  arms  control and
Soviet  strategy;  by Zdzislaw  M.  Rurarz, who  spent  a quarter
century in Polish military  intelligence, on Soviet approaches to
arms control; by Igor Lukes  on linguistic deceptions inherent in
the  Soviet use  of  language; by  William  and Harriet  Scott on
Soviet  ideology;  and  by  William  R.  Harris  summarizing U.S.
reports on  Soviet violations.  The  Douglass volume  ought to be
mandatory reading for president-elect Bush, and for those members
of  Congress  who  regard  documented  exposes  of  Soviet treaty
violations as akin to warmongering.
   The editor asks: Why shouldn't  the U.S.S.R. cheat when it can
get away with it?  Over the past three years, Mr. Douglass shows,
U.S.  trade  and  credits  granted  to  the  Soviet  Union ``have
expanded in synchronization  with the public  unfolding of a wide
array of Soviet cheating.''
   The most cogent commentary on American foreign policy was made
privately  by  Andrei Gromyko  [1909-]  some years  ago.   He was
responding to  the question of  what he regarded  as the greatest
weakness  of  U.S. foreign  policy.   The question  was  posed by
Arkady N. Shevchenko, his aide and senior U.N. official who later
defected  to  the  U.S.   Referring  to  American  statesmen, Mr.
Gromyko said:
   ``They  don't  comprehend  our final  goals  and  they mistake
tactics for strategy.  Besides, they  have too many doctrines and
concepts  proclaimed at  different times,  but  the absence  of a
solid, coherent, and consistent policy is their big flaw.''
   Gen.  Sejna has  supplied a  list  of special  instructions he
received from Moscow  in 1963 on  how to cheat  and what to cheat
about.  The one area where  Soviet cheating is apparently minimal
are  agreements  with  commercial  organizations  --  for obvious
reasons.
   Kenneth  L. Adelman,  director of  the  U.S. Arms  Control and
Disarmament Agency  from 1983-1987 in  a post-resignation article
discussing his experiences, wrote:
   ``We  never  really found  anything  much to  do  about Soviet
cheating.  That's  the sad  truth.  Those  outside government may
well wonder why, year after year, we reported a pattern of Soviet
violations and did nothing about it.  ...  We tried -- oh! how we
tried --  to come  up with  effective countermeasures,  but there
didn't seem to  be any. ...  [Congress] mandated that  we stay in
arms agreements  that the Soviets  were violating.''   Oh! how we
tried: Nice talk from a superpower.

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