]]]]]]]]]]]]] PLAY THE US HAND WITH ARAFAT [[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[ by Noel Koch (1/25/1989) WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1/13/1989 (Mr. Koch formerly headed the Pentagon's counterterrorism program and now runs his own international-security firm.) From 1981, when President Reagan promised "swift and effective retribution" against terrorism, through last month's bombing of Pan American Flight 103, the U.S. has endured a long list of casualties from such acts, virtually all of which occurred in or emanated from the Mideast. Since its beginning the Reagan administration debated with itself over how to redress our Mideast relationship, whose terms some view as being dictated by Israel. Little of importance was done to formalize this impulse (we did tilt toward Irag in the Iran-Iraq war, thus winning Iraq's contempt). In practice, "redressal" consisted of approving, over Israel's objections, sales of weapons to several Arab countries. This momentarily pleased the nations that could afford those weapons -- chiefly Saudi Arabia -- but that is all it did. It did not change the political geometry of the Mideast, nor our part of it. Now, the geometry is changed. In a daring 11th-hour improvisation, Secretary of State Shultz has let the Palestinian genie out of the U.S. Mideast policy bottle, and America's relationship with the region is materially and irrevocably altered, whether for better or worse. If anything positive is to come of this, we're going to have to be a lot cleverer about terrorism -- which is central to our Mideast concerns -- than we have been to date. The prospective assassination of Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij is an elementary case in point. What Yasser Arafat said, whether he said it, whether he meant it, and even whether Mr. Freij is finally assassinated are very nearly irrelevant for the simple reason that none of these matters affects available U.S. policy choices. The fact is that the normally nimble Mr. Freij has made himself more useful dead than alive (at least for now) to a variety of factions throughout the Mideast. For the U.S. to take the slightest interest in the matter will be to reinforce the lesson we failed to learn in Lebanon: We must not bamboozle ourselves into a lethal fecklessness by linking ourselves to circumstances over which we have no control. Let us concern ourselves with what touches directly on our interests, and areas in which we may now have leverage. Thus far, Mr. Arafat has gotten more than he has given in exchange with Mr. Shultz. True, he renounced terrorism. But since he has never agreed that the violence he directed is terrorism ("We are freedom fighters and we are proud of it"), it cannot have caused him great inconvenience to renounce it. And he has recognized Israel's existence, but that he should have been asked to do so at all is far more an exaltation of his own role than an affirmation of Israel's right to exist. Indeed, a world rightside-up might find it grotesque that so much importance should be assigned to whether Mr. Arafat acknowledges Israel. In return for concessions to which we assign far greater political weight than does Mr. Arafat, the PLO is invited to the U.S. diplomatic table. We might reasonably ask him to throw a few more shekels in the scale to show good will and, indeed, he seems inclined to do so. He has offered the cooperation of his intelligence services in finding out who destroyed Pan Am 103. One sees that the offer holds for Mr. Arafat, among other things, an opportunity to even accounts with enemies (or to direct attention away from friends). Yet, disingenuous though it may be, it also provides him a valuable chance to demonstrate that he can make a distinction between the business of the freedom fighter and that of the terrorist. We should encourage his best efforts, and not limit that encouragement to the resolution of the Pan Am bombing, in which his "findings" may or may not be credible. Where he can demonstrate complete credibility is by helping us clear the books on those operations carried out at his personal direction -- such as the murders of U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel, U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Curtis Moore, and Belgian attache Guy Eld in Khartoum, Sudan, in 1973. (No need to withhold the details now; after all, he says himself he is "proud" of these actions.) He can help by providing us the names of groups and individuals graduated from PLO training camps, especially those of the Europeans, Africans and Central Americans. This would enable us to understand better the nature and range of the problems we face in confronting "freedom fighters" outside the Middle East. We have some of this information from records the Israelis captured at Sidon in the 1982 Lebanon campaign, but it will be useful to have corollary and corroborating data. He can help by reviewing with us the range of training and assistance directly provided by Palestinians to other nations. We know, for example, that Palestinian pilots have been in Central America training Nicaraguan pilots. But who trained the Palestinians, and where else are they operating? It would be useful for American fighters to know in advance the nature of the threat they may confront in other parts of the world. Finally, he can help by sharing with us his information on terrorist groups supported by other Mideastern states. In this, we have a virtual community of interest. While these groups, such as Syria's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command or the Libyan-hosted Fatah Revolutionary Council, are happy to murder Americans in the service of their hosts, they are no less interested in getting rid of Mr. Arafat. In case we haven't noticed, we have now aligned ourselves with Mr. Arafat. The last time we chose sides between warring factions in the Middle East, it cost us 241 American Marines. This time, I believe, it cost us 259 on a U.S. airliner and 11 Scots. For the Marines, we got nothing. If 270 souls are the price of our latest peace-making effort, we should require something back in the way of progress. Nothing Yasser Arafat does now can heighten further the dangers of the step he has already taken. If he is to continue the march to Palestinian statehood, we must try to discover and inspire in him those actions that comport with the risks and responsibilities of a head of state. It will be a difficult transition, dismounting from the tiger of terrorism. Let us be patient and realistic as Mr. Arafat tries to feel his way down. If he does. * * *
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